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JURISPRUDENTIAL CHALLENGES TO THE PROTECTION OF THE 
NATURAL ENVIRONMENT 
By 
D E Fisher 
 
Introduction 
Nature exists.  Humans exist.  The behaviour of one impacts upon the other.  The behaviour of 
humans is governed by the artificial contrivance described as the law.  While the law can in this way 
control the behaviour of humans and the impact that human behaviour has on nature, the 
behaviour of nature is governed – if at all- in accordance with nature’s own sets of values which are 
quintessentially a matter for nature.  The relationship between nature and humans may be the 
object of rules of law, but traditional legal doctrine dictates that humans but not nature are the 
subjects of the rules of law.  The jurisprudence of the earth – it would appear – seeks to equalise in 
the eyes of the law nature as part of the global environment and humans as part of the global 
environment.  How might this be done? 
The jurisprudential foundations of environmental law 
(a) Ethical approaches 
These issues underlie the ongoing discourse about the jurisprudential foundations of environmental 
law.  Are they anthropocentric, ecocentric, a combination of both, or neither?  If the fundamental 
values underling environmental law are anthropocentric, does this necessarily exclude nature from 
consideration?  In responding to this question in the context of a human right to an adequate 
environment, this has been one view:  
The right cannot be conceived as implying or condoning indifference towards the non-
human world since in requiring that the non-human environment should be preserved in the 
condition that is adequate for human health and wellbeing it implies – especially in a world 
as disrupted by anthropogenic environmental harms as this one now is – rather stringent 
demands of environmental protection.  Moreover, part of its core rationale is to oppose the 
unbridled pursuit of those rights that do manifest the most “strongly” anthropocentric 
tendencies1.  
An anthropocentric view of environmental law thus contemplates “stringent demands of 
environmental protection”.  But this view goes somewhat further:  
                                                          
1 Tim Haywood, Constitutional Environmental Rights (Oxford University Press, 2005) at p33. 
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The more that humans come to understand about the inter-connectedness of their health 
and well-being with that of non-human nature, the more inseparable appear their interests 
with the “good” of nature2.  
Significantly the language used here is the language of a human right linked to the “good” of nature 
– in this sense an economic perspective of nature- but in the context of the “interests” of humans 
and of nature.  And finally in this context: 
A human right to an adequate environment does not preclude the taking of other, 
complementary, approaches to environmental and ecological problems.  It might also serve 
in many ways to support them and to enhance their potentiality for success3.  
Accordingly a human right to an adequate environment does not by itself exclude a recognition of 
the intrinsic values of nature and possibly even of a right of nature to its own intrinsic values.   
An ecocentric approach to environmental law is premised upon a need to respect and protect the 
values of nature for their own sake.  Such an approach need not necessarily exclude recognition that 
the values of nature are important for the sake of humans.  Four arguments have been presented in 
support of an ecocentric approach to environmental law.  Synoptically these are: 
• interdependence 
• spiritual harmony 
• extensionism  
• fictionism4. 
These four arguments have been paraphrased in this way: 
Interdependence is the idea that all forms of life are interdependent and must be valued for 
their interdependence.  Spiritual harmony is the feeling that individuals have with nature.  In 
a sense the spirit of individual people is coextensive with the spirit of nature.  Extensionism 
treats the environment and ecosystems as persons in the same way as other entities are 
afforded legal personality.  Fictionism is the device by which a status is afforded to the 
environment or an ecosystem by deeming it to have rights which it would not otherwise 
have5.  
This suggests that the most important concepts from the point of view of the law are personality and 
status rather than rights.  While nature may in this way have personality and status, this is of little 
practical value unless the law goes further and creates responsibilities that not only acknowledge 
but also “respond” to the personality and status of nature.  
                                                          
2 Ibid, p34. 
3 Ibid, p35. 
4 John Alder and David Wilkinson, Environmental Law and Ethics (Macmillan Press, 1999) at pp66-68. 
5 D E Fisher, Australian Environmental Law: Norms, Principles and Rules (Thomson Reuters, 2010) at p38. 
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A different but not inconsistent approach to environmental law is the approach of biocentrism.  On 
the face of it, it is somewhat narrower than ecocentrism but not dramatically so.  Effectively all living 
organisms are the focus of this approach.  Humans can identify their own values. But how are the 
values of non-human living organisms identified?  This is done by adopting a teleological approach.  
Thus: 
Our conceiving of each organism as a teleological centre of life is our recognition of the 
reality of its existence as a unique individual, pursuing its own good in its own way.  By 
developing the process of heightened awareness of it as the particular individual it is, we 
achieve a full understanding of the point of view defined by its good.  We then have the 
capacity needed to make the moral commitment involved in taking the attitude of respect 
toward it, even though having this capacity does not necessitate our making the moral 
commitment6.   
This is one way of recognising an intrinsic value.  Again there is no reference to rights.  However this 
approach requires the existence of duties that are owed to all living organisms.  For example: a duty 
not to harm any living organism and a duty to compensate any wronged living organism7.   
A third approach that has emerged is the doctrine of ecological justice8.  It seeks to bring together an 
anthropocentric approach with an ecocentric approach.  Its thesis is that a theory of justice should 
include not only social justice but also ecological justice.  Ecological justice is linked to 
intergenerational justice and intragenerational justice – these two being elements of social justice.  
Intergenerational justice and intragenerational justice in the form of intergenerational equity and 
intragenerational equity are already principles supporting sustainability.  The introduction of 
ecological justice moves the discourse towards if not an ecocentric approach at least something 
moving in that direction.  If ecological justice is a value to be included within the law, how is it 
formalised?  This is the answer: 
The reasonable choice, therefore, is for a duty to pass on the integrity of the planetary 
system as we have inherited it (ecological integrity). 9 
The need for ecological integrity reflects the concern for the non-human natural world. This concept 
is described as inter-species justice.  Ecological justice thus comprises intergenerational justice, 
intragenerational justice and interspecies justice.  Once again, rights are not part of this conceptual 
framework.  But the doctrine of ecological justice is supported by a duty “to pass on the integrity of 
the planetary system” as it has come down from preceding generations.  
                                                          
6 Paul Taylor, Respect for Nature: a Theory of Environmental Ethics (Princeton University Press, 1986) at pp 
128-129. 
7 Ibid at pp 172 to 192. 
8 Klaus Bosselmann, The Principle of Sustainability: Transforming Law and Governance (Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 
2008) at pp 96-99. 
9 Ibid at p98. 
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(b) Rights approaches 
The jurisprudential conundrum about the rights of nature began in 1972.  The discourse then 
centred upon a procedural right rather than any substantive rights.  It was, in other words, all about 
standing.   This was the point of commencement: 
Natural objects would have standing in their own right, through a guardian; damage to and 
through them would be ascertained and considered as an independent factor; and they 
would be the beneficiaries of legal awards.  But these considerations only give us the 
skeleton of what a meaningful rights – holding would involve.  To flesh out the “rights” of 
the environment demands that we provide it with a significant body of rights for it to invoke 
when it gets to court.  10  
The rules about standing have ebbed and flowed across many jurisdictions.  Generally speaking it 
would seem that the rules have been liberalised over recent years but not to the extent that “natural 
objects” have “standing in their own right”.  For the most part, it would seem, nature has standing 
only through the agency of a human institution.  But jurisprudence has evolved to suggest “what a 
meaningful rights – holding would involve.”  The significant development in legal doctrine is the 
recognition of nature not as an object but as a subject within the law.  Whether it has rights or not, 
nature has a personality or a status recognised by the law and from this a number of consequences 
follow. Its existence is recognised. Its existence is capable of protection.  Its existence cannot be 
ignored.  In this sense it is not unlike a human right in the sense that a human right recognises the 
existence of intrinsic human values that are ultimately capable of being protected by the law.  These 
rights are not protected immediately as human values.  But they are capable of mediate protection 
through an associated set of obligations. In this sense they are inchoate rights evolving into 
protectable rights. Indeed it has been quite specifically recognised that: 
The difficulties inherent in moving from the current philosophy of governance to Earth jurisprudence 
surface as soon as one mentions “rights” for animals or the environment – particularly if there are 
lawyers present11.  Arguably is has become a question of relationships rather than one of rights and 
duties by themselves.  The attribution of personality or status to nature as a subject within the law 
carries with it the implication that nature is capable of sustaining legal relationships with other 
subjects within the law.  This seems to be the essence of the statement which is the locus classicus 
of this proposition.  Namely:  
The universe is a communion of subjects, not a collection of objects.  As subjects the 
component members of the universe are capable of having rights.  Every component of the 
Earth community has three rights: the right to be, the right to habitat and the right to fulfil 
its role in the ever-renewing processes of the Earth community12. 
                                                          
10 Christopher Stone, “Should trees have standing? – towards legal rights for natural objects” (1972) 45 
Southern California Law Review 450 
11 Cormac Cullinan, Wild Law: A Manifesto for Earth Justice (Chelsea Green Publications, 2nd ed, 2011) at p95. 
12 Ibid, at p 103 quoting Thomas Berry, ' Appendix 2 - Ten Principles for Jurisprudence Revision' in Airlie Center 
(ed), Evening Thoughts: Reflecting on Earth as a Sacred Community (Sierra Club Books, 2006)  
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There is accordingly a relationship between the human and the non–human elements of the 
environment that comprises the planet Earth.  These elements are subjects that have personality 
and status within the law.  It is a specific function of the law to determine precisely what these 
relationships are.  If this is the jurisprudential model to which the law is moving, are there any 
examples of such rules and how would such a jurisprudential model be structured? 
(c) Structural approaches 
A certain degree of commonality is emerging in the way in which international legal instruments and 
national legal instruments are structured.  These are: 
• a framework of normative values 
• competence rules 
• strategic rules 
• regulatory rules 
• liability rules 
• marked rules13. 
Because of the nature of international law, international legal instruments tend to comprise 
statements of normative values, statements of principles, statements of objectives and relatively 
general statements of obligations.  National legal instruments tend to be much more specific in their 
substance- particularly in relation to the substance of obligations.  What is important is the 
relationship between all of the structural elements of these instruments.  A statement of normative 
values simply explains the fundamental ideas and concepts upon which the system is based.  
Competence rules explain what nation states, agencies within nation states and individuals within 
nation states may do.  Strategic rules inform the substance of competence rules by explaining the 
outcomes to be achieved in exercising the powers comprised in the competence rules.  Regulatory 
rules limit the ways in which the powers described in competence rules are exercisable.  Liability 
rules provide for remedies and sanctions for breach of the rules in question.  Market rules – a more 
recent phenomenon of environmental law- are a combination of these rules having effect as 
economic regulatory instruments.   
What is equally important is the linguistic, the grammatical and the syntactical structure of the 
sentences that state these rules. Statements of normative values are of general application. They 
apply to nobody in particular but everybody in general. Statements of principle, of strategy and of 
outcome are similar but directed more at particular sets of circumstances. Statements comprising 
regulatory rules are even more specific. They are directed at identifiable persons – individuals, 
corporations or institutions – in defined sets of circumstances. Liability rules are similarly 
constructed. A duty may be owed to a particular person, to a person falling within an identifiable 
group or to all persons within the community. An example of the first is a contractual liability; of the 
second, a tortious liability; and of the third a criminal liability. Can nature or the natural environment 
be accommodated or is a new approach needed? In other words, if nature has personality or status 
within the law, how can rules be structured to create a legal relationship between nature and 
                                                          
13 D. E. Fisher, above n5 at pp9-11. 
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humans as subjects of the law and the extensive range of rules that are the objects of the law. An 
analysis of some examples will illustrate this discourse.  
The structure of international instruments 
(a) Principled approaches 
Let us begin with the structure of international legal instruments.  It is not surprising -given 
their provenance – that the Stockholm Declaration 1972, the World Charter for Nature 1982 and the 
Rio Declaration 199214 are cast in the forms of statements of principles.  Most are intrinsically 
anthropocentric while some are ecocentric in approach.  Principle 1 of the Stockholm Declaration 
confers upon “man” a right and a responsibility conjunctively.  Principle 4 elaborates upon this 
responsibility by identifying “a special responsibility to safeguard and wisely manage the heritage of 
wildlife and its habitat.”  Consequently “nature conservation must therefore receive importance in 
planning for economic development”.  While principle 1 is thus intrinsically anthropocentric, 
principle 4 is a combination of anthropocentric and ecocentric values.  Principles 2,3 and 5 restrict 
the human use of natural resources.  The beneficiary of these restrictions is human kind and 
incidentally the natural resources themselves.  The principal beneficiary of the obligation in principle 
6 is an ecosystem, although human kind will be incidentally benefitted also.  What is significant 
about the way these principles are structured is this.  Principles 2,3,5 and 6 are cast grammatically in 
the intransitive or passive voice.  In other words the sentence has a subject but not an object.  In 
grammatical terms, the subject of the sentence appears in the nominative case.  There is nothing in 
the accusative case.  The ultimate objective of the obligation stated in the sentence appears 
grammatically in the form of a proposition in what may loosely be described as the dative case.  This 
grammatical analysis may sound unnecessarily arcane.  But it is critical, it is suggested, in the context 
of attributing personality and status- and perhaps rights – to non-human subjects. According to this 
analysis, the “natural resources of the earth” described in principle 2 are the subjects of these legal 
arrangements or relationships.   
The Rio Declaration introduced formally the idea of sustainable development.  It is almost entirely 
anthropocentric in approach.  Principle 1 states unequivocally that “human beings are at the centre 
of concerns for sustainable development.”  It goes on to provide that human beings are “entitled to 
a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature.”  While nature is thus recognised, it appears to 
be a subsidiary element in this approach.  There is a similar balance between principles 3 and 4.  
Principle 3 asserts that the right to development must be fulfilled “so as to equitably meet 
developmental and environmental needs of present and future generations.”  Principle 4 explains 
that environmental protection is an integral part of the development process.  Significantly again, 
the grammatical structure of these statements of principle is intransitive or passive.   
The Rio Declaration goes on to impose something in the nature of obligations upon states, although 
they are described as principles.  For example, principle 11 imposes an obligation on states to enact 
effective environmental legislation.  Similarly, principle 13 imposes an obligation on states to 
develop national law regarding liability and compensation for the victims of pollution and other 
environmental damage.  Clearly protection of the environment and the prevention of environmental 
                                                          
14 For the text see Philippe Sands and Paolo Galizzi (eds), Documents in International Environmental Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2004) at pp4-23. 
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damage are elements of the achievement of sustainable development.  But in grammatical terms 
these outcomes are in the accusative case while states are in the nominative case.  In this way states 
are the subjects of these arrangements within the system.  The environment and nature – indirectly- 
remain the objects of the system.  
The World Charter for Nature similarly balances the anthropocentric and ecocentric values.  But in 
this case- unlike the Stockholm Declaration and the Rio Declaration – the focus is perhaps more 
ecocentric than anthropocentric.  In this respect articles 1,2 and 4 are critical.  Article 1 states: 
 Nature shall be respected and its essential processes shall not be impaired.  
There is no reference whatsoever to human kind.  Neither part of the sentence has an object in the 
accusative case.  There is no reference to whom or to what nature is to be respected and its 
essential processes not to be impaired.  The implication, perhaps, is that these implied obligations 
are imposed upon human kind.  This is consistent with the provision in article 24: 
Each person has a duty to act in accordance with the provisions of the present Charter; 
acting individually, in association with others or through participation in the political 
process, each person shall strive to ensure that the objectives and requirements of the 
present Charter are met. 
Clearly there is a duty and equally clearly it is imposed upon all members of human kind.  Just as 
significantly, the second half of the sentence contemplates that the Charter contains not only 
objectives but also requirements.  Is article 1 an objective or a requirement? It is structured as a 
requirement; the beneficiary of the requirement is nature and its essential processes; accordingly 
nature and its essential processes are the subjects rather than the objects of these legal 
arrangements.  Article 2 is structured similarly.  However the subjects of these arrangements are 
more specific.  The first is genetic viability.  The second is the population levels of all life forms.  The 
third is necessary habitats.  Again there is no reference to human kind.  The focus is accordingly 
ecocentric.  Then there is article 4.  It states:  
Ecosystems and organisms, as well as the land, marine and atmospheric resources that are 
utilised by man, shall be managed to achieve and maintain optimum sustainable 
productivity, but not in such a way as to endanger the integrity of those other ecosystems or 
species with which they coexist. 
There is a very clear anthropocentric perspective to this proposition.  There is, first, the reference to 
the use of resources by human kind and, second, the objective of optimum sustainable productivity.  
However, this anthropocentric perspective is a counterpoint to the ecocentric perspective in the 
reference to the integrity of ecosystems and species.  Article 4 thus creates a balance between the 
two approaches while articles 1 and 2 disclose an ecocentric approach.  Significantly, all of these 
three articles treat nature, its essential processes and its more specific elements as the subjects of 
these propositions.  In grammatical terms these subjects are cast in the nominative case; there are 
no objects in the accusative case; any outcomes incorporated in these propositions appear in the 
dative case.   
The World Charter for Nature goes on to explain how these principles are to be given effect through 
a range of functions and a range of implementation provisions.   Article 6, for example, contemplates 
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respect for these fundamental principles and article 14 contemplates the reflection of these 
principles in the legal system both international and national.  Article 10, however, goes beyond the 
acknowledgement of principles to recognise a set of prescriptive rules.  In terms, natural resources 
are to be used “with a restraint appropriate to the principles” in the Charter but also “in accordance 
with the following rules”.  There are four such rules.  One relates to the limited use of living 
resources.  Another relates to the maintenance of the productivity of soils.  The third deals with the 
reuse or recycling of water resources.  The fourth provides for the limited exploitation of non-
renewable resources.  Once again these propositions give to these elements of the natural 
environment the status of subjects.  But they are “rules”.  These rules are in the form of passive – 
grammatically intransitive – requirements.  Just as important, as we have seen, article 24 imposes a 
duty on each person to strive to ensure that the requirements are met.  Accordingly, when all of 
these propositions are considered and then applied together, what emerges is nature as a subject 
within these legal arrangements. These legal arrangements are not only recognised but also given 
effect through the obligation- albeit limited- to satisfy the objectives and requirements of this 
instrument.  It emerges as a very interesting model for consideration. But it needs to be borne in 
mind that the World Charter for Nature is technically a resolution of the General Assembly of the 
United nations and not in itself a binding legal instrument.   
(b) Rules based approaches 
 It is trite to observe that the structure of multilateral environmental agreements is 
fundamentally different.  While the rights of nation states – for example rights associated with 
sovereignty – are recognised, it is the range of obligations imposed upon nation states that are 
designed to achieve the conservation of the relevant natural resources and the protection of the 
relevant environment.  While most of these agreements contain competence rules and limitation 
rules, the emphasis for obvious reasons is upon limitation rules.  And it is equally significant that the 
obligations imposed by these limitation rules are imposed for the most part but not entirely upon 
nation states.  Accordingly, to a very large extent, nature and the environment are the objects rather 
than the subjects of these legal arrangements.  While the focus of these arrangements is 
anthropocentric, this does not mean that ecocentric perspectives are excluded.  In other words 
nature may be the beneficiary of these arrangements just as human kind may be their beneficiary.  
Let us consider two examples.   
The first is the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage 
197215.  The definition of natural heritage in article 2 states the four perspectives according to which 
the quality of the several components of the world natural heritage is to be determined: aesthetics, 
science, natural beauty and conservation. The first three disclose an unambiguous anthropocentric 
perspective.  Conservation, however, includes the natural heritage as one of the beneficiaries of 
these arrangements.  Why is this so? First, article 5 (d) imposes an obligation upon states to take the 
appropriate measures, including legal measures, necessary for the identification, protection, 
conservation, presentation and rehabilitation of the natural heritage.  Conservation is one outcome.  
Given its juxtaposition with those two other outcomes, it would appear that it is different from the 
others.  Identification, presentation and probably rehabilitation disclose a clearly human 
                                                          
15 For the text see Philippe Sands and Paolo Galizzi, above n 13 at  pp646-660. 
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perspective.  Protection may include a human as well as a non-human perspective.  But conservation 
appears to be directed specifically at the non-human perspectives of conservation.   
Then, secondly, the reason for this is the way in which the third element of the definition of natural 
heritage in article 2 is formulated.  Relevantly it includes the habitat of threatened species of animals 
and plants of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science or conservation.  In this 
respect science and conservation are treated differently.  Science involves the knowledge and 
understanding of human kind. In this respect human kind is the beneficiary of these arrangements.  
Reference to conservation, however, in this context of the habitat of threatened species seems to 
focus upon the species as such rather than the interest of human kind in the species.  Both are 
relevant.  The disjunctive reference to science and conservation in this provision implies that the 
habitat of threatened species requires to be conserved for the benefit of the species.  While this may 
well be speculative, these arrangements clearly distinguish to some extent between the human and 
the non human perspectives of the conservation of the world natural heritage.   
Then there is the Convention on Biological Diversity 199216.  The statement of the objectives of the 
Convention in article 2 contains three objectives: 
• the conservation of biological diversity 
• the sustainable use of its components 
• the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the use of genetic 
resources. 
The second and third objectives clearly disclose a human perspective.  In common with most 
multilateral environmental agreements the Convention imposes a series of obligations upon nation 
states to take a range of measures to achieve the objectives of the convention.  These obligations 
are cast in an active form rather than a passive form.  The measures for in- situ conservation are 
separate from those for ex-situ conservation.  The obligations in article 8 (a) and (b) in relation to in-
situ conservation refer only to means for conserving biological diversity.  Consistently with this, but 
more specifically, article 8(d) talks only about the protection of ecosystems, natural habitats and the 
maintenance of viable populations of species in natural surroundings.  On the other hand, article 8(c) 
says this: 
Regulate or manage biological resources important for the conservation of biological 
diversity whether within or outside protected areas with a view to ensuring their 
conservation and sustainable use.   
There is a focus, therefore, in the first part of this obligation upon the conservation of biological 
diversity.  However the objectives of this system of regulation and management are linked 
ultimately to the conservation of biological resources and their sustainable use.   
In this way the Convention not only distinguishes between conservation and sustainable use in the 
statement of objectives in article 1.  It also takes this distinction into the detail of the obligations 
imposed by article 8 upon nation states.  This is not to suggest that the objective of conservation is 
designed to benefit and to benefit only the biological diversity of nature.  In these contexts it focuses 
                                                          
16 Ibid, pp 698-724. 
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upon the conservation of biological diversity and the beneficiary of these arrangements is principally 
biological diversity but also incidentally human kind.  The references to sustainable use in article 10 
may be similarly analysed but the effect is to reverse the principal focus of these arrangements.  
Once again, this may be speculative.  But the Convention discloses both anthropocentric and 
ecocentric perspectives.  The balance between these perspectives is determined in accordance with 
the precise textual arrangements in the relevant provision.  In some instances the conservation of 
biological diversity for its own sake is the principal focus and sustainable use is an incidental 
outcome. In other cases it is the other way round.  What is emerging, then, is a set of arrangements 
that recognises the need for the use and development of the resources of nature for the benefit of 
human kind and at the same time the need for nature to be conserved not only for its own sake but 
also incidentally for the benefit of human kind.  In other words the movement towards sustainable 
development.   
(c) An integrated approach 
One of the best examples of this emerging approach is the Draft International Covenant on 
Environment and Development17.  Although it is not a binding legal instrument, it is indicative of how 
legal doctrine is evolving.  Its structure is clear: 
• an objective 
• nine fundamental principles 
• a set of general obligations imposed on states and persons 
• a set of more specific obligations relating to natural systems and resources 
• a set of obligations relating to processes and activities 
• a set of obligations relating to global issues 
• a range of provisions relating to implementation, responsibility, liability and 
compliance.  
These various provisions perform the functions and assume the forms that we have already 
discussed: namely a framework of normative values; competence rules; strategic rules; regulatory 
rules; liability rules; and market rules. 
The obligations are in the form to be expected of an international legal instrument: namely the 
imposition of duties or obligations upon the states parties to the instrument.  A number of 
obligations are also imposed upon persons.  What is particularly important for present purposes is 
the structure of the objective and of the fundamental principles.  The objective in article 1 is this: 
The objective of this Covenant is to achieve environmental conservation and sustainable 
development by establishing integrated rights and obligations.   
The single objective thus comprises two conjunctively linked outcomes.  These are in effect the 
conservation of the environment and the sustainable development of the resources of the 
environment.  It is however the distinctive use of the words “conservation” and “development” that 
is important.  Protection of the environment is an element of sustainable development.  So is 
                                                          
17 IUCN Commission on Environmental Law, Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development  
2nd Edition updated text 2000, (IUCN, Gland and Cambridge) 
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environmental conservation.  But arguably conservation for this purpose focuses upon the 
conservation of nature as an ecocentric outcome rather than an anthropocentric outcome.  Clearly, 
on the other hand, sustainable development focuses upon development as an anthropocentric 
outcome.  The function performed by the fundamental principles is to guide the state parties in 
achieving the objective of the Covenant.  It is no surprise that the principles are formulated as a set 
of rules with nature or elements of nature as their subject rather than their object.   
Let us consider two examples.  Article 2 states this: 
Nature as a whole warrants respect.  The integrity of the Earth’s ecological systems shall be 
maintained and restored.  Every form of life is unique and is to be safeguarded independent 
of its value to humanity. 
The focus of this principle is unambiguously ecocentric.  Each sentence contains a subject and a verb 
but no object.  This is important.  It means in effect that this principle is of unrestricted application 
and, to the extent that there is an obligation, the obligation is imposed upon everyone.  Again 
significantly, the second and third of these statements are in the form of an obligation expressed 
passively.  There is, in other words, an implied duty to maintain and restore the integrity of the 
Earth’s ecological systems and to safeguard every form of life independently of its value to 
humanity.   
The structure of article 6 is different.  It states: 
Protection of the environment is best achieved by preventing environmental harm rather 
than by attempting to remedy or compensate for such harm. 
The beneficiary of this limited obligation is the environment.  However the principle explains how 
the environment is to be protected: namely by preventing harm rather than by remedying harm.  In 
this way the principle states an outcome- the protection of the environment -  and states how this is 
to be done. This implies an obligation to prevent environmental harm.  Again these implied 
obligations are not imposed upon anyone in particular but upon everyone in general.  Their form, in 
other words, is passive rather than active.   
This interpretation is supported by the way article 20 is formulated.  It places an obligation upon 
states parties to the instrument to take appropriate measures “to conserve and, where necessary 
and possible, restore natural systems which support life on Earth in all its diversity.”  The obligation 
in article 20 thus constitutes the legal mechanism according to which the objective stated in article 1 
and principles stated in articles 2 and 6 are implemented.  It is no surprise that the form of this 
obligation is active and not passive.  This international legal instrument thus indicates how nature 
and its components can be not only recognised within the legal system but also given the status of a 
subject within the legal system.  In addition nature is the object of the active obligations imposed 
upon the states parties to the instrument.  A set of relationships is thus beginning to emerge within 
the legal system and these relationships include those between the natural environment and what 
might be described very broadly as the human environment.   
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The structure of national instruments 
(a) A constitutional approach 
 It is to be expected that national legal systems will adopt a much more specific and much 
more directed approach to the recognition of nature within the legal system.  Once again nature 
may be recognised directly or indirectly, as a subject or object of the legal system or perhaps in 
other ways.  The mechanisms may include constitutional rules, strategic rules, regulatory rules and 
liability rules.  There is a small number of examples of each18.   
Let us begin with the recently introduced but well recognised approach adopted by the Constitution 
of Ecuador19.  It is the first paragraph of article 71 that stipulates a unique approach to nature.  It 
provides: 
Nature, or Pacha Mama, where life is reproduced and occurs, has the right to integral 
respect for its existence and for the maintenance and regeneration of its life cycles, 
structure, functions and evolutionary processes.   
In grammatical terms nature is the subject of this provision and the right is the object of this 
provision.  The object is the right to respect for its present existence and for its continual existence 
in the future.  The existence of nature is the subject matter of respect and respect is the subject 
matter of the right.  On the face of it, this analysis also applies to the maintenance and regeneration 
of nature. The reason for this is the use of the preposition “for” in relation to both existence and 
maintenance.  Accordingly the “right of nature” stipulated in article 71 is not a right of nature to its 
present and future existence but a right to respect for these values.  This necessarily raises this 
important question.  Nature is entitled to respect but by or from what or whom.  The answer lies in 
the second and third paragraphs of article 71 and in articles 72 and 73 in conjunction with the 
provisions in article 83 (6) and (13) and in articles 404 and 406.  In effect the answer is everyone 
within the community including all natural and legal persons together with all the agencies of the 
state.   
These constitutional provisions contain a series of competence rules and limitation rules.  The 
competence rules include a power to request public authorities to enforce the rights of nature and 
the limitation rules include the lengthy set of obligations imposed upon the state in relation to the 
protection of nature and the promotion of respect for it.  The range of limitation rules relating to the 
state includes the obligation in article 406.  Accordingly: 
The state shall regulate the conservation, management and sustainable use, recovery, and 
boundaries for the domain of fragile and threatened ecosystems, including among others 
high Andean moorlands, wetlands, cloud forests, dry and wet tropical forests and 
mangroves, marine ecosystems and sea shore ecosystems.   
                                                          
18 Peter Burdon, 'The Rights of Nature: Reconsidered' (2010) 49 Australian Humanities Review 69, pp71-77. 
19 For the text of the relevant provisions in English provided by the Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores de 
Ecuador see http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/Ecuador/english08.html and reprinted in the 
Appendix. 
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The beneficiary of this obligation to regulate is clearly these elements of nature.  However nature is 
not the only beneficiary of these constitutional arrangements.  Article 83 (6) imposes this obligation 
upon all Ecuadorians.  Namely: 
To respect the rights of nature, preserve a healthy environment and use natural resources 
rationally, sustainably and durably.   
Clearly there is a duty to respect the rights of nature but this obligation goes further.  It is to use 
natural resources in the three ways specified.  And who is going to use these natural resources? 
Clearly Ecuadorians.  The notion of Ecuadorians as the beneficiary of these arrangements is 
supported by article 74.  It states:  
Persons, communities, peoples, and nations shall have the right to benefit from the 
environment and the natural wealth enabling them to enjoy the good way of living.   
Accordingly the relationship between all of these provisions suggests two conclusions: 
• nature is entitled to respect from human kind 
• human kind is under an obligation to respect nature and at the same time is entitled 
to benefit from nature.  
The Constitution is thus a complex blend of intrinsic values, relatively specific rights and more 
specific obligations.  The structure, form and language of these arrangements contemplate the 
capacity of the legal system to recognise these rights, protect these rights and enforce these 
obligations.  The Constitution of Ecuador talks about the rights of nature.  It does so in ways not 
unlike the arrangements in the World Charter for Nature 1992.  There is accordingly a human as well 
as a non-human perspective included in these arrangements.  The English version of the Constitution 
suggests that, when the rights of nature are analysed in the context of the Constitution at large, 
these rights emerge as rights in relation to nature as well as rights of nature.  In any event, whatever 
the strictly linguistic view of these constitutional propositions, nature is given a personality and a 
status within them.   
(b) A diversity of approaches in Australia 
 Let us direct our attention now towards Australia.  Australia, like many jurisdictions, has 
approached the conservation of nature in accordance with sets of rules in the form of strategies and 
principles.  Some are relatively general while others are more specific.  These strategies and these 
principles reflect – as one would expect – those acknowledged by international law.  The principles 
in support of environmental management emerged in 1992 through the Intergovernmental 
Agreement on the Environment together with the National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable 
Development20.  Section 3 of the agreement sets out the principles of environmental policy.  
According to paragraph 3.2: 
The parties consider that the adoption of sound environmental practices and procedures, as 
a basis for ecologically sustainable development, will benefit both the Australian people and 
environment, and the international community and environment.   
                                                          
20 For the relevant principles see D.E. Fisher, above n5 at pg 136-138 
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Accordingly these principles are designed to benefit human kind and the environment.  The 
agreement also states the principles in support of ecologically sustainable development.   
The national strategy adopted a similar approach.  Its goal is development that maintains the total 
quality of life, both now and in the future, in a way that maintains the ecological processes on which 
life depends.  Once again a combination of human and non-human perspectives.  One of the core 
objectives of the national strategy is to protect biological diversity and maintain essential ecological 
processes and life-support systems.  The national strategy – like the agreement- sets out the 
principles that complement the achievement of ecologically sustainable development.  The 
Commonwealth, the States and the Territories responded by including in their environmental 
legislation not only statements of principle along these lines but also statements of strategy 
according to which- in very broad terms- the goal of ecologically sustainable development could be 
achieved.   
In New South Wales the fundamental outcome of the arrangements for protecting the environment 
is this: 
To protect, restore and enhance the quality of the environment in New South Wales, having 
regard to the need to maintain ecologically sustainable development21.   
This fundamental outcome is supported by a range of subsidiary objectives and by a statement of 
the principles according to which ecologically sustainable development can be achieved22.  The 
strategies stated in the 1991 Act are directed at the Environment Protection Authority and those in 
the 1997 Act are of general application. 
The arrangements in Victoria – although structured somewhat differently- are much the same.  The 
purpose of the Environment Protection Act 1970 is to create a legislative framework for the 
protection of the environment in Victoria having regard to the principles of environment 
protection23. Parliament specifically intended that in the administration of the Act regard should be 
given to these principles24.  The eleven principles include these two25: 
• the conservation of biological diversity and ecological integrity should be a 
fundamental consideration in decision making  
• protection of the environment is a responsibility shared by all levels of Government 
and industry, business, communities and the people of Victoria.   
                                                          
21 Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991 (NSW), s6(1) (a) and Protection of the Environment 
Operations Act 1997 (NSW), s3(a). 
22 Protection of the Environment Administration Act 1991 (NSW) , 6(1)(b) and (2), and Protection of the 
Environment Operations Act 1997(NSW) , s3(b)-(g). 
23 Environment Protection Act 1970 (VIC), s1A(1). 
24 Ibid, s1A(3). 
25 Ibid, s1E and 1G(1). 
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The first of these two principles is an inclusive feature of most of these statements of principle.  
However the principle of shared responsibility- although implicit in many other jurisdictions in 
Australia – is uniquely stated in this form.  It seems clear that the approach in Australia generally to 
the protection of the environment includes a range of human and non-human perspectives.  This is a 
simple reflection of what environment means for these purposes.  Unambiguously it includes but 
clearly is not restricted to the natural components of the environment.  The grammatical structure 
of these principles is important. The first is cast in the mould of an intransitive statement while the 
second contemplates the involvement of the whole Victorian community.  
 
This approach is reflected- at least to some extent- in the way a number of the issues coming before 
the courts have been determined in Australia26.  A particularly helpful analysis was included in the 
decision of the Land and Environment Court of New South Wales in the Telstra case decided in 
200627.  The Chief Justice took the opportunity to develop the concept of ecologically sustainable 
development and undertook a detailed analysis of six of the most important principles of 
ecologically sustainable development28.  These were: 
• the principle of sustainable use 
• the principle of effective integration of economic and environmental considerations 
• the precautionary principle  
• the principles of intergenerational and intragenerational equity  
• the principle that conservation of biological diversity and ecological integrity should 
be a fundamental consideration 
• the principle of the internalisation of environmental costs.  
Each of these principles involves a relationship between the human and the non -human 
beneficiaries of the values of the natural environment.  Although the expression “consideration” 
appears twice, the need to resolve competing interests appears not only from the use of this 
expression but also from the use of the expressions describing the other principles.  The concepts of 
sustainable use, intergenerational equity and intragenerational equity involve an analysis of the 
relationship between the human and the non-human perspectives of the management of the 
natural environment.  It is no surprise that the legislation designed to protect the environment 
involves this duality of approach.  Such a duality of approach is the essence of ecologically 
sustainable development.  While each of these two elements is part of this duality of approach, it is 
a matter for the legislation itself to indicate the relationship between them.   
Is this true of the legislation that is concerned on the face of it with the conservation of nature 
rather than the protection of the environment more generally?  For this purpose let us consider the 
Nature Conservation Act 1992 of Queensland.  It contains statements of value, strategic rules, 
management principles, regulatory rules and liability rules.  It is the first three that are particularly 
                                                          
26 For example see D.E. Fisher, above n5, Chapter 10. 
27 Telstra Corporation Ltd v Hornsby Shire Council (2006) 146 LGERA 10 
28 Ibid at pp 35-37. 
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significant for present purposes.  The object of the Act is the conservation of nature29.  Nature 
includes all aspects of nature and specifically includes: 
• ecosystems and their constituent parts 
• all natural and physical resources 
• natural dynamic processes 
• the characteristics of places, however large or small, that contribute to their 
biological diversity and integrity or their intrinsic or scientific values30.   
Conservation is stated to mean the protection and maintenance of nature while allowing for its 
ecologically sustainable use31.  The meaning of conservation thus specifically includes the possibility 
of the ecologically sustainable use of the natural resources of the environment.  Complementary to 
this is the definition of nature to the extent that it includes all natural and physical resources and it is 
the use of the word resources that imports an economic perspective into this meaning.  Accordingly 
the focus of these arrangements is the protection and maintenance of nature.  However, incidentally 
to this, there is the opportunity for the ecologically sustainable use of components of nature.  
This duality of approach is reflected in the management principles stated for the range of protected 
areas.  Let us consider the management principles that relate to national parks32.  There are three 
conjunctive outcomes.  These are: 
• permanent preservation of the area’s natural condition and the protection of the 
area’s cultural resources and values 
• presentation of the area’s cultural and natural resources and their values 
• ensuring that the only use of the area is nature based and ecologically sustainable. 
The beneficiaries of the second and third are human beings while the focus of the first is the natural 
environment.  The Act specifically states that the first of these three principles is “the cardinal 
principle” for the management of national parks33.  Accordingly- it would seem on the face of it- the 
permanent preservation of the area’s natural condition and the protection of the areas cultural 
resources and values are the principal focus of these arrangements.  They are in this way afforded a 
degree of priority in a way that is unique.   
(c) Judicial approaches 
The way in which national parks are managed was an issue for the Supreme Court of Queensland in 
2000 in a case that concerned a proposal to undertake development works on Lizard Island which is 
a national park34.  The earlier legislation which applied contained a statement of the cardinal 
                                                          
29 Nature Conservation Act 1992 (QLD), s4. 
30 Ibid, s8. 
31 Ibid, s9. 
32 Ibid, s17(1). 
33 Ibid, s17(2). 
34 Cape York Land Council Aboriginal Corporation v Boyland & Anor(2000) QCA 202 
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principle in almost identical terms to the cardinal principle in the 1992 Act.  The earlier legislation 
however contained an additional provision to the effect that: 
The Director shall exercise his powers under this Act in such manner as appears to him most 
appropriate to achieve this objective.  
In any event a justiciable issue emerged for the court.  Had the Director observed the cardinal 
principle in making the decision in question.  The approach to be adopted was stated in these terms: 
The correct question was what was the most appropriate way of achieving the objective of 
the permanent preservation, to the greatest possible extent, of the natural condition of the 
park having regard to all the circumstances including the existence of the sublease for 
tourist and recreational facilities; whether it was by refusing permission to construct the 
buildings or to grant it subject conditions or, as seems most unlikely, to grant it 
unconditionally35.   
The enactment of the cardinal principle thus created an issue – a legal issue- for determination.  The 
court indicated the methodology for decision making required by the legislation.  The Director had 
failed to do so and the decision was invalid. The focus of the management principles for national 
parks upon the permanent preservation of their natural condition is consistent with the object of the 
1992 Act – namely the conservation of nature.  While the sustainable use of nature is permissible, it 
is not the focus of the legislation.  The judicial interpretation of the provision has pointed very clearly 
in the direction of the conservation of nature and this has been given priority in this context.  And it 
is a legal priority not an executive priority. Strategic rules, stated as principles and objectives, were 
accordingly enforced through a careful interpretation of the language of the legislation.  
The reasoning of the Supreme Court of Queensland in this case was in many respects similar to the 
reasoning of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in an earlier case in 
197636.  The issue was the validity of a permit granted under the Marine Mammal Protection Act 
enacted by the United States Congress in 197237. The permit enabled fishing for yellow fin tuna in a 
way that trapped in a net both the tuna and the associated porpoise – a species of marine mammals 
in danger of extinction or depletion.  The Act required regulations to be made about the taking of 
marine mammals provided that “such taking will not be to the disadvantage of those species and 
population stocks and will be consistent with the purposes and policies set forth” in the Act38.  The 
procedure for making the regulations involved publishing information about the optimum 
sustainable population of the species in question39. Further, any permit granted under the Act was 
                                                          
35 Ibid at para 16. 
36 Committee for Humane Legislation v Richardson (1976) 540 F. 2d 1141 helpfully referred to by Cormac 
Cullinan n10 at p114 
37 For the relevant text see 16 U.S.C.A.ss 1361-1374. 
38 Ibid, s1373(2a). 
39 Ibid, s1373(d)(2). 
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required to be “consistent with any applicable regulation” made under the Act40.  The declaration of 
policy stated in the Act included two significant statements: 
• such species and population stock should not be permitted to diminish beyond the 
point at which they cease to be a significant functioning element in the ecosystem of 
which they are apart, and, consistent with this major objective, they should not be 
permitted to diminish beyond their optimum sustainable population41 
• marine mammals should be protected and encouraged to develop to the greatest 
extend feasible commensurate with sound policies of resource management and 
that the primary objective of their management should be to maintain the health 
and stability of the marine ecosystem42. 
There was accordingly a “major objective” and a “primary objective” and each was directed at 
protecting the marine mammals in question from overexploitation by human activity.   
One of the issues for the court was whether the proper procedures had been followed in making the 
regulations.  In fact it was determined that there had been a failure to comply with the obligations in 
the Act in this respect.  However, there was this further- and for our purposes more important – 
point.  It was the relevance and the significance of the policy stated in the Act and the relationship 
between the stated policy, the regulations and the permit.  The Court of Appeals agreed “with the 
District Court’s conclusion that the Act was to be administered for the benefit of the protected 
species rather than for the benefit of commercial exploitation.”43  But that did not determine the 
issues.  The Act, it will be recalled, required the permit to be consistent with the regulations and the 
regulations to be consistent with the purposes and policies stated in the Act.  The Court of Appeals 
concluded: 
The court has carefully examined the American Tunaboat Association’s 1974 permit 
application and its 1975 renewal application.  Neither contains any discussion of the 
predicted impact of the proposed takings on the optimum sustainable population of the 
porpoise species involved, or otherwise displays consistency with the purposes of the 
Marine Mammal Protection Act.  We concur in the judgment of the District Court that the 
applications were deficient under the terms of the Act and should not have been granted44.   
Apart from the procedural issues involved, it is clear that the grant of the permit was inconsistent 
with the regulations and that the regulations were inconsistent with the purposes of the Act for the 
reason that the Act was designed to benefit the protected species rather than the commercial 
fishing population.  While the legislation permitted commercial fishing, the focus of the legislation 
was marine mammal protection- as indeed its title suggested.  But it was the statement of policy in 
                                                          
40 Ibid, s1374(b)(1). 
41 Ibid, s1361(2). 
42 Ibid, s1361(6). 
43 Committee for Humane Legislation v Richardson 540 F 2d. 1141 at p1148. 
44 Ibid, at p1151. 
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the Act and the relationship between the policy, the regulations and the permit that led to the 
conclusion of the court of appeals.  The porpoise were in this case the beneficiary of the legislation. 
Human kind also benefitted from the legislation but –very importantly- subject to a set of 
enforceable rules that afforded priority in a situation such as this to the protection of the marine 
mammal species.   
(d) Evolving liability regimes 
The proceedings in the Supreme Court of Queensland and in the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia were essentially in the nature of judicial review proceedings.  In each case the decision of 
the executive was held to be invalid.  Any executive decision is potentially liable to be held invalid.  
But there are other forms of liability recognised by the law.  These may prove to be particularly 
significant in the context of the conservation and protection of nature.  If nature has personality and 
status within the law and possibly even rights associated with it, then an infringement of these rights 
or a breach of any duties associated with these rights may subject the responsible party to some 
form of liability rules.  Liability rules traditionally provide a remedy for a person or an institution who 
has suffered loss of damage as a result of the unlawful conduct of another person.  There have been 
movements over recent years to create liability regimes to provide a remedy for damage sustained 
by nature and natural resources.  An early attempt at the international level to introduce 
arrangements based on civil liability was the Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from 
Activities Dangerous to the Environment 199345.  Then in 2004 the European Union enacted the 
Directive on Environmental Liability with the regard to the Prevention and Remedying of 
Environmental Damage46.  However two of the most interesting national responses have been the 
provisions creating liability for destruction or loss of natural resources under the Comprehensive 
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of the United States and the Environmental 
Damage Prevention and Remediation Act 2007 of Germany.  The German Act implements the 
European Union Directive.  In this way natural resources in the case of the United States legislation 
and the environment in the case of the German legislation receive a degree of personality and status 
within the legal system to become the beneficiaries of these liability regimes.   
Let us consider first the more limited application of the United States legislation47.  It applies to a 
release or a threatened release of a hazardous substance from activities or locations for which the 
person is responsible48.  The person responsible is liable “for damages for injury to, destruction of, or 
loss of natural resources”49as a consequence of the activities of the person responsible.  For this 
purpose natural resources are land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water, drinking water 
supplies, and other such resources controlled by the Unites States, other government agencies or 
                                                          
45 For the text see Phillipe Sands and Paolo Gallizzi (eds), above n13 at pp 1242-1262. 
46 Directive 2004/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 on Environmental 
Liability with regard to the Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage 2004 (2004/35/EC), p56. 
47 For the relevant text see 42 U.S.C.A. ss9601-9607. 
48 Ibid, s9607(a). 
49 Ibid, s9607 (a)(4)(c). 
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any Indian tribe50.  This person responsible is liable to compensate for the damage to the natural 
resources and this includes the reasonable costs of assessing the damage resulting from the 
release51.  It is specifically provided that the President of the United States acts on behalf of the 
public as trustee of these natural resources for the purpose of recovering the compensation for the 
damage sustained by the natural resources52.  Liability does not arise if the damage in question had 
been identified “as an irreversible and irretrievable commitment of natural resources in an 
environmental impact statement” and the commitment of these natural resources had been 
authorised specifically by a permit or a licence53.  While the range of natural resources to which 
these provisions apply is quite extensive, liability is restricted to a release or a threatened release of 
a hazardous substance in a fairly narrow set of circumstances.  The beneficiaries of these provisions 
are the relevant natural resources through the fiduciary responsibilities of the United States under 
the Act.  
The Environmental Damage Prevention and Remediation Act 2007 of Germany54 is structured rather 
differently.  It imposes three fundamental obligations upon the responsible party. These are: 
• an obligation to inform the competent authority of an imminent threat of 
environmental damage or the occurrence of environmental damage55 
• an obligation to take the necessary preventive measures56 
• an obligation, where environmental damage has occurred, to take the necessary 
damage control measures and the necessary remedial measures.57   
Quite specifically the responsible party is liable for the costs of the preventive measures, the damage 
control measures and the remedial measures58.  The way in which these obligations are discharged is 
supervised by the competent authority of the state59.   
The critical concepts underlying these obligations are the responsible party, an occupational activity 
and environmental damage.  The responsible party is any natural or legal person who engages in or 
controls the occupational activity thereby directly causing environmental damage or the immediate 
                                                          
50 Ibid, s9601(16). 
51 Ibid, s9607(a)(4)(e). 
52 Ibid, s9607(f)(1). 
53 Id. 
54 Environmental  Damage Prevention and Remediation Act 2007 (Federal Republic of Germany), 
<http://www.bmu.bund.de/files/pdfs/allgemein/application/pdf/u_schad_g_eng.pdf> accessed  
55 ibid, s4. 
56 Ibid, s5. 
57 Ibid, s6. 
58 Ibid, s9(1). 
59 Ibid, ss7-8. 
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threat of such damage60.  An occupational activity is any activity carried out in the course of an 
economic activity, a business or an undertaking, irrespectively of its private or public, profit or non-
profit character61.  Environmental damage is damage to species and natural habitats, water damage, 
or land damage by impacts on soil functions62.  Accordingly liability arises when a person engages in 
or controls an activity which directly causes damage.  Damage more specifically is a measurable 
adverse change in a natural resource or a measurable impairment of a natural resource which may 
occur directly or indirectly63.  A natural resource for this purpose is paraphrased to mean species and 
natural habitats, water and soil.  Liability is restricted to damage directly caused by an occupational 
activity.  Occupational activities are defined in Annex 1 to the Act.  The list is extensive.  It includes 
activities related to water pollution prevention and control, waste management, water abstraction, 
release of dangerous substances, transport of dangerous goods, air pollution prevention and control, 
genetic engineering activities and activities involving genetically modified organisms.  Clearly the 
beneficiaries of these arrangements are the natural resources identified by the Act.  It seems equally 
clear that humans indirectly benefit from these arrangements.  While the focus is ecocentric, it is to 
this extent anthropocentric in approach.  Most importantly for present purposes, species, natural 
habitats, water and soil as are the natural resources in question are recognised for their own sake 
and in this sense have personality and status.  The Act does not go so far as to talk in terms of rights.  
The fundamental instruments for preventing and remediating environmental damage are the 
obligations imposed upon responsible parties.  The object of the Act is to prevent and remedy 
environmental damage.  In this sense environmental damage is the object rather than the subject of 
these rules.  Although the legal mechanisms are structurally traditional, there can be little doubt that 
the subjects of the legislation are the natural resources in question.  
The conservation of water resources as an element of nature 
Significantly the liability rules in the United States legislation and in the German legislation apply to 
water.  Water is essential to sustain all forms of life – whether human or non-human.  Water 
resources as the subject of legal arrangements are governed not only by the liability rules described 
in the foregoing paragraphs but also by a range of other mechanisms.  The concept of a reserve has 
emerged in a number of jurisdictions over recent years.  One is South Africa.  According to the 
National Water Act 1998 the reserve is the quantity and quality of water required for two purposes.  
The first is to satisfy basic human needs by securing a basic water supply and the second is to protect 
aquatic ecosystems in order to secure ecologically sustainable development and use of the relevant 
water resource64.  The national water resource strategy must provide for the requirements of the 
reserve and identify where the water is to come from65.   There is an obligation placed upon the 
                                                          
60 Ibid, s2(3). 
61 Ibid, s2(4). 
62 Ibid, s2(1). 
63 Ibid, s2(2). 
64 National Water Act 1998 (South Africa), s1 (xviii). 
65 Ibid, s6(1)(b)(i). 
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relevant minister to determine the reserve for all or part of the relevant water resource66.  Once it 
has been determined, there is an obligation to give effect to the reserve67.  Accordingly the joint 
beneficiaries of the reserve are humans and aquatic ecosystems.   
The legislation in Victoria has restricted the concept of a reserve to the environmental water 
reserve68.  It comprises water that is set aside for the environment in a number of different ways.  
One is as an environmental entitlement69. A second is as a condition in an instrument granting rights 
in relation to water70.  A third is in accordance with any management plan71.  The objective is that 
the environmental water reserve is maintained so to preserve the environmental values and health 
of water ecosystems, including their biodiversity, ecological functioning and quality of water and the 
other uses that depend on their environmental condition72.  The focus of this objective is ecocentric 
although the other uses of water designed for the benefit of humans may well depend on the 
environmental condition of the water.  The required outcomes of a sustainable water strategy 
include to improve the maintenance of the environmental water reserve and to increase the volume 
of water in the environmental water reserve and so to improve the environmental values and health 
of water ecosystems73.  Environmental water may be seen through these mechanisms to be the 
subject of these arrangements and given effect through a series of instruments including as an 
element of the strategy and as an environmental entitlement in its own right.  This comes close to 
recognising that the environment – or nature- is capable of having a right in relation to water.   
One of the water management principles included in the Water Management Act 2002 of New South 
Wales is the protection and restoration of water sources, floodplains and dependent ecosystems 
including ground water and wetlands74.  There is a duty to take all reasonable steps to perform 
functions in accordance with these principles75.  More specifically the Act provides for what is 
described as environmental water.  Basically it is water that is committed by management plans for 
fundamental ecosystem health or other specified environmental purposes76.  A management plan 
must provide for the identification, establishment and maintenance of planned environmental water 
                                                          
66 Ibid, s16(1). 
67 Ibid, s18. 
68 Water Act 1989 (VIC), s4A. 
69 Ibid, s4A(1)(a). 
70 Ibid, s4A(1)(b)(i). 
71 Ibid, s4A(1)(b)(ii). 
72 Ibid, s4B(1). 
73 Ibid, s22C(1)(c) and (d). 
74 Water Management Act 2000 (NSW), s5(2)(a) 
75 Ibid, s9(1)(a). 
76 Ibid, s8(1)(a). 
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in the form of environmental water rules77.  Environmental water rules must be established for all of 
the water resources in the State78.  The natural environment is the beneficiary of these 
environmental water rules.  Accordingly water may be seen to be the subject of these arrangements; 
the environment is the object of these arrangements; and the relationship between the subject and 
the object is governed by the environmental water rules which are on their face enforceable.   
A different approach has been adopted in Queensland.  The purpose of the relevant provisions of 
the Water Act 2000 is to advance sustainable management and efficient use of water and other 
resources79.  One of the outcomes of sustainable management is the protection of the biological 
diversity and health of natural ecosystems80.  A water resource plan is required – among others- to 
state the ecological outcomes for the sustainable management of the water in question81.  One of 
the ways of doing this is the formulation of environmental flow objectives82.  An example of this 
approach is the Water Resource (Burnett Basin) Plan 2000.  One of the general outcomes stated in 
the plan is for water to be managed and allocated to make water available for the environment83.  
The plan states the ecological outcomes for the plan area84 and the environmental flow objectives to 
be achieved in the plan area85.  The environmental flow objectives are supported by a range of 
performance indicators for the achievement of these objectives86.  The ecological outcomes are 
extensive.  These include: 
• to maintain pool habitats and their associated native plants and animals in 
watercourses87  
• to provide flow regimes that favour native plants and animals associated with 
watercourses88 
• to provide wet season flow to benefit native plants and animals89.   
                                                          
77 Ibid, s8(2). 
78 Ibid, s8(3). 
79 Water Act 2000 (QLD), s10(1). 
80 Ibid, s10(2)(b). 
81 Ibid, s46(1)(e). 
82 Ibid, s46(4)(b). 
83 Water Resource (Burnett Basin) Plan 2000 (QLD), s6(j). 
84 Ibid, s7. 
85 Ibid, s19 and parts 1 and 2 of Schedule 5. 
86 Ibid, s20. 
87 Ibid, s7(a). 
88 Ibid, s7(c). 
89 Ibid, s7(d). 
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The beneficiaries of these outcomes are – almost literally- the natural environment.  Once again, 
however, humans may be seen to be incidentally benefitted by these arrangements.  These 
arrangements significantly assume the form of a set of strategic rules that drive the operational 
management of the water resources in question.  Water is the subject of these rules and the various 
components of the natural environment are their object.  Significantly there is no reference directly 
to humans.   
There are two major river basins in Australia that cross state or territory boundaries.  One is the Lake 
Eyre Basin and the other is the Murray – Darling Basin.  The former is governed strategically by the 
Lake Eyre Basin Agreement Act 2001. This is an accord between the Commonwealth and the basin 
states of Queensland and South Australia.  The latter is governed strategically and operationally by 
the Water Act 2007 of the Commonwealth which incorporates the Murray Darling Basin Agreement.  
The agreement is an accord between the Commonwealth and the basin states of South Australia, 
Victoria, New South Wales and Queensland.  The Act sets out the objects to be achieved in managing 
the Murray- Darling Basin. It is the Murray -Darling Basin Plan formulated under the Act that 
implements the strategic objectives in an operational manner.  The water resources of the Lake Eyre 
Basin are thus managed operationally in accordance with the rules of the Basin states while the 
Murray- Darling Basin is managed in accordance with the rules of the Basin states but subject to the 
potentially overriding rules in the Murray- Darling Basin Plan and the Water Act 2007.   
The Lake Eyre Basin Agreement scheduled to the Act contains a statement of purpose, of objectives 
and of guiding principles.  The principles acknowledge that the area to which the agreement applies 
“has important social, environmental, economic and cultural values which need to be conserved and 
promoted.”90  It goes on to state a further principle: 
That the water requirements for ecological processes, biodiversity and ecologically 
significant areas within the Lake Eyre Basin Agreement Area should be maintained, 
especially by means of flow, variability and seasonality91.  
The basin states are thus expected but probably not required to manage the water resources in 
question in this way.  However it is the rules relating to the management of water resources in the 
basin states that will ensure that this is achieved.  While the environmental water requirements of 
the basin are acknowledged in this way, their status as a principle leaves them somewhat distant 
from any formal recognition of their personality or status.  That is a matter for the basin states.   
The Water Act 2007 in conjunction with the Murray-Darling Basin Agreement is somewhat different.  
The arrangements for managing environmental water are complex but the outcomes are quite clear.  
These arrangements comprise a set of strategic rules and operational rules explained by a range of 
interrelated definitions.  The strategic rules are stated in section 3(d) as objects of the Act.  There are 
three: 
• to ensure the return to environmentally sustainable levels of extraction for water 
resources that are over allocated or overused  
                                                          
90 Lake Eyre Basin Agreement Act 2001 (QLD), Schedule 1, cl. 3.1.(a). 
91 Ibid, Schedule 1, cl.3.1.(d). 
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• to protect, restore and provide for the ecological values and ecosystem services of 
the Murray- Darling Basin 
• subject to these two to maximise the net economic returns to the Australian 
community from the use and management of the Basin water resources.   
The Murray-Darling Basin Plan is critical in achieving these outcomes.  Its purpose is to promote the 
objects of the Act92 and this specifically includes: 
• the establishment and enforcement of environmentally sustainable limits on the 
quantities of water that may be taken93 
• basin- wide environmental objectives for water-dependent ecosystems of the 
Murray –Darling Basin94. 
More specifically the basin plan must include the maximum long- term annual average quantities of 
water that can be taken on a sustainable basis95 and an environmental watering plan96.  Section 23 
requires that sustainable diversion limits for the basin water resources must reflect an 
environmentally sustainable level of take.  Sustainable in this context unambiguously means 
environmentally sustainable.  The ultimate outcome of the environmental watering plan according 
to section 28(1)(d) and (e) is twofold: 
• to protect and restore the wetlands and the other environmental assets of the basin 
• to protect biodiversity dependent on the basin water resources and achieve other 
environmental outcomes for the basin. 
Accordingly there is an obligation that the environmental watering plan must specify the overall 
environmental objectives for the water-dependent ecosystems of the basin97.  Significantly all of 
these provisions are formulated as objects of the Act and as outcomes of the basin plan and of the 
environmental watering plan.  These obligations are not imposed upon anyone in particular- for 
example public agencies- but rather permeate the substantive structure of these arrangements.  In 
this sense it is water that is the subject of these arrangements and the object is the achievement of 
these objectives.  In this possibly indirect way water as a component of the natural environment is 
attributed a degree of personality and status.   
These substantive rules are explained by the complex set of definitions in the Act and the 
institutional arrangements centred upon the Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder.  The 
critical definitions stated in section 4(1) are these: 
                                                          
92 Water Act 2007 (Cth), s20 
93 Ibid, s20(b). 
94 Ibid, s20(c). 
95 Ibid, s22(1) item 6. 
96 Ibid, s22(1) item 9. 
97 Ibid, s28(2)(a). 
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• environmental assets which include ecosystems and ecosystem services  
• environmentally sustainable level of take which protects environmental assets, 
ecosystem functions, environmental outcomes but also the productive base of the 
water resource   
• environmental outcomes which include ecosystem function and biodiversity  
• environmental water is either held or planned environmental water 
• environmental watering is the delivery or use of environmental water to achieve 
environmental outcomes 
• held environmental water is water available under an entitlement for the purpose of 
achieving environmental outcomes 
• planned environmental water is water committed by a plan or other instrument to 
achieve environmental outcomes or other environmental purposes and which 
cannot be taken or used for any other purpose.   
The objects of the Act and the contents of the Basin Plan clearly envisage the human as well as these 
ecological perspectives of water resources governance.  For example consumptive use is the use of 
water for private benefit consumptive purposes and these include irrigation, industry, urban, stock, 
and domestic use98. Critical human water needs99 are an important element of these overall 
arrangements.  Nevertheless, environmental water in the context of environmental assets and 
environmental outcomes occupies a very significant and in many respects a unique position in these 
arrangements.   
This view is consistent with the institutional arrangements for the management of environmental 
water by the Commonwealth.  The principal function of the Commonwealth Environmental Water 
Holder is to manage the Commonwealth environmental water holdings100.  These are the rights and 
interests of the Commonwealth in relation to water101.  The performance of this function is carefully 
circumscribed by the Act.  The purpose to be achieved in performing these functions is clear. It is to 
protect or restore the environmental assets of the basin and other areas outside the basin where the 
Commonwealth holds water102.  This is complemented by the obligation to manage environmental 
water holdings in accordance with the environmental watering plan103.  There is in addition a 
restriction upon the power of the Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder to dispose of water 
and environmental water holdings.  Essentially water or water holdings cannot be disposed of unless 
the water is not required to meet the objectives of the environmental watering plan or any other 
relevant plan or instrument104.  In performing most of these functions the environmental water 
                                                          
98 Ibid, s4(1). 
99 Ibid, s86A(2). 
100 Ibid, s105(1)(a). 
101 Ibid, s108. 
102 Ibid, s105(3). 
103 Ibid, s105(4)(a). 
104 Ibid, s106(1). 
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holder is independent of the relevant minister or department105.  Accordingly the unique attribution 
of personality and status to water by these strategic and operational rules of substance is supported 
by the institutional arrangements for the management of environmental water by the 
Commonwealth.   
These examples indicate quite clearly that water resources are managed for the benefit of humans 
as well as for the benefit of the environment.  The focus of these arrangements and any priorities 
implicit in them are a reflection of their structure, their form and their language.  Indeed much often 
depends upon not only the language but also the grammatical structure of the sentences that 
comprise the relevant propositions of law.  The range of approaches has included: 
• the reserve in the South African legislation 
• the environmental water reserve as an element of a sustainable water strategy in 
the Victorian legislation  
• the priority given to the protection of a water source and its dependent ecosystems 
by the water management principles in the New South Wales legislation 
• the requirement for ecological outcomes in water resource plans under the 
Queensland legislation 
• the critical functions performed by the environmental water holder according to 
detailed strategic and operational rules under the Commonwealth legislation.  
These legal arrangements are subtly different.  Water is recognised in different ways and the non-
human values and benefits of water are similarly recognised and protected in different ways.  In 
each of these cases the water is the subject of these arrangements not only in a substantive sense 
but also in linguistic and grammatical senses.  This is not to suggest that the values and benefits of 
water for humans are ignored.  Indeed they are not ignored.  However it is the relationship between 
the human values and benefits and the non-human values and benefits that is emerging as a 
particularly significant element of all of these arrangements.  Water may be one example but, it has 
been suggested, it is not the only example.   
An emerging jurisprudence of environmental governance 
The jurisprudence of environmental governance has traditionally been little different from any other 
form of governance.  In other words interrelated sets of rights, obligations and liabilities.  Rights 
have been structured as competence rules: for example, in the case of international law rights of 
sovereignty and in the case of national legal systems rights of property.  These have been 
increasingly circumscribed by limitation rules which limit or restrict or perhaps even prohibit the 
exercise of these rights arising out of competence rules.  Essentially the subjects and the objects of 
these arrangements have been humans.  The protection of the environment and the conservation of 
its natural resources have become only recently a part of this paradigm.  Thus the law has for the 
most part remained traditionally anthropocentric in approach.  In other word the right to use and 
develop a natural resource has been constrained by the obligation to protect the environment out of 
which the resource has been taken and into which waste has been deposited.  The jurisprudence of 
environmental law has become a complex set of arrangements bringing together these rights and 
                                                          
105 Ibid, s107. 
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these obligations leading ultimately to potential liabilities.  But the environment, nature and natural 
resources have increasingly been perceived to have values beyond those of interest and benefit to 
humans.  The emergence, in other words, of an ecocentric approach.  This has for the most part 
evolved through the legal system not only as a responsibility to protect the environment and to 
conserve natural resources but also as a human right in relation to these outcomes.  So outcomes in 
the form of strategic rules within the legal system are a significant element of the jurisprudence of 
environmental law.  What has emerged is a set of relationships between these instruments: 
• statements of value and of principle 
• strategic rules 
• regulatory rules 
• liability rules.   
These elements of the system inform each other and are increasingly becoming a part of a more 
coherent system.   
The approach of international law- because of its nature- has been to preface international 
instruments by statements of value, principle, and outcome.  But significant instruments such as 
international declarations and United Nations resolutions have emerged as the context of more 
specific sets of rights and obligations in the form of multilateral agreements.  For example, as we 
have noted, the Stockholm and Rio Declarations informed a series of multilateral agreements that 
have in specific sets of circumstances implemented these principles and strategies.  And it has been 
the World Charter for Nature that has been particularly significant in the context of formulating an 
ecocentric approach.  It is the structure of these instruments that has been critical.  A passive rather 
than an active form has been adopted.  The subject of the arrangements has increasingly become 
the environment, nature or the natural resources of the environment and the object of these 
arrangements – or the objective of the processes - is the use, development, protection, preservation 
or conservation of these elements.  In this way the focus has changed.  While humans have been by 
no means excluded, there has been increasingly a recognition of the intrinsic values of the 
environment and of nature that need to be protected and conserved for their own sake rather than 
simply for the benefit of humans.   
National legal arrangements have followed a similar evolutionary approach.  It has been the 
incorporation of strategic rules within the system that has intrinsically changed the relationship 
between all of the elements of the system.  The common law for the most part has avoided a 
consideration of the outcomes of decision-making processes.  The outcomes of decision making 
processes have now become an essential element of the system. These outcomes as the objects of 
the system have become increasingly related to the subjects of the system such as the environment 
and nature.  Humans as the holders of rights in the strict sense and as the subjects of legal 
relationships have traditionally been subjected to obligations that limit the exercise of these rights.  
But the nature of these obligations has dramatically changed as the result of the emergence of a 
much more detailed and comprehensive set of not only regulatory rules but also of strategic rules.   
There has always been a relationship between rights and obligations.  And so it has remained even in 
the context of the environment and nature.  It may be premature to suggest that nature and the 
environment have rights.  But the way in which environment and nature are now recognised by the 
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law affords to them, it has been suggested, a form of personality and status.  Not only that- the 
nature of rights attributed to humans has probably changed as well.  Certainly humans have 
personality and status within the law.  As such humans are capable of holding rights and sustaining 
obligations.  But the relationship between these rights and these obligations has changed to the 
extent that in the environmental context at least the right has been substantively eroded to the 
point that it is almost meaningless except in relation to the obligations that relate to it.  In other 
words competence rules have increasingly been overtaken by not only liability and regulatory rules 
but also by strategic rules.  In this way national legal system are in many respects following the 
model of the international legal system.  For example, our analysis of: 
• the liability rules for loss of or damage to natural resources in accordance with the 
legislation of the United States of America and of Germany 
• the liability rules invalidating the permit to take porpoise under the marine 
mammals protection legislation of the United States of America 
• the liability rules invalidating the authorisation of construction activities on Lizard 
Island under the national parks and wildlife legislation of Queensland 
• the objects and principles stated in the environmental protection legislation of New 
South Wales 
• a set of principles stated in the environmental protection legislation of Victoria  
• the strategic rules and the operational rules stated in the nature conservation 
legislation of Queensland  
• the recognition of nature coupled with responsibilities towards nature in the 
Constitution of Ecuador  
• the ways in which water has emerged as the subject of legal relationships in a 
number of different ways in Australia.  
The law has always been about defining the relationship between humans as persons either in their 
individual capacity or their institutional capacity.  The objects of these relationships have been the 
matters of interest and concern to humans whether they are material, non-material, biological, 
physical, cultural or spiritual.  Such as, for example, life, physical integrity, reputation, property.  The 
jurisprudence of environmental law has added to these by including nature and the environment in 
the traditional form of what may be described as a human right in relation to the environment or to 
an environment of an acceptable quality.  Whether there is such a right depends on what are the 
subjects and what are the objects of the legal arrangements.  Whether it is appropriately called a 
right or not may not matter.  It is the substance of the relationship between the subjects and the 
objects of the legal relationships that is important.  And the same may well be true of nature and the 
environment.  The recognition of nature for its own values is attributing to it a personality or status 
within the legal system.  Similarly whether it is a right or not may not matter.  What is important is 
the relationship between nature as a subject of a legal relationship and the objects associated with 
this legal relationship.  It may well be premature to make this assertion.  But the dynamic processes 
of the law are changing and perhaps changing in this direction.   
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Appendix 
Constitution of Ecuador 
Article 71. Nature, or Pacha Mama, where life is reproduced and occurs, has the right to integral respect for its existence and for the maintenance and regeneration of its life cycles, structure, functions and evolutionary processes. All persons, communities, peoples and nations can call upon public authorities to enforce the rights of nature. To enforce and interpret these rights, the principles set forth in the Constitution shall be observed, as appropriate. The State shall give incentives to natural persons and legal entities and to communities to protect nature and to promote respect for all the elements comprising an ecosystem. 
Article 72. Nature has the right to be restored. This restoration shall be apart from the obligation of the State and natural persons or legal entities to compensate individuals and communities that depend on affected natural systems. In those cases of severe or permanent environmental impact, including those caused by the exploitation of nonrenewable natural resources, the State shall establish the most effective mechanisms to achieve the restoration and shall adopt adequate measures to eliminate or mitigate harmful environmental consequences. 
Article 73. The State shall apply preventive and restrictive measures on activities that might lead to the extinction of species, the destruction of ecosystems and the permanent alteration of natural cycles. The introduction of organisms and organic and inorganic material that might definitively alter the nation’s genetic assets is forbidden. 
Article 74. Persons, communities, peoples, and nations shall have the right to benefit from the environment and the natural wealth enabling them to enjoy the good way of living. Environmental services shall not be subject to appropriation; their production, delivery, use and development shall be regulated by the State. 
Article 83. Ecuadorians have the following duties and obligations, without detriment to others provided for by the Constitution or by law: 6. To respect the rights of nature, preserve a healthy environment and use natural resources rationally, sustainably and durably. 13. To preserve the country’s cultural and natural heritage and to take care of and uphold public assets.  
Article 404. The unique and priceless natural assets of Ecuador include, among others, the physical, biological and geological formations whose value from the environmental, scientific, 
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cultural or landscape standpoint requires protection, conservation, recovery and promotion. Their management shall be subject to the principles and guarantees enshrined in the Constitution and shall be conducted in accordance with land use planning and ecological zoning, in compliance with the law. 
Article 405. The national system of protected areas shall guarantee the conservation of biodiversity and the maintenance of ecological functions. The system shall be comprised of state, decentralized autonomous, community and private subsystems, and it shall be directed and regulated by the State. The State shall allocate the financial resources needed to ensure the system’s financial sustainability and shall foster the participation of the communities, peoples, and nations who have their ancestral dwelling places in the protected areas in their administration and management. Foreign natural persons or legal entities will not be able to acquire any land deeds or concessions in areas of national security or protected areas, in accordance with the law. 
Article 406. The State shall regulate the conservation, management and sustainable use, recovery, and boundaries for the domain of fragile and threatened ecosystems, including among others, high Andean moorlands, wetlands, cloud forests, dry and wet tropical forests and mangroves, marine ecosystems and seashore ecosystems. 
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